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THE PORTO RICO TARIFFS OF 1899 AND I9OO.
The sole object of this paper is to consider the lawfulness
of the customs duties which have been and are to be levied by
the United States Executive upon goods imported into the
island of Porto Rico, and upon goods imported from that island
into the States of this Union.
The tariff history of Porto Rico, since the American occu-
pation, is already divided into three periods: First, that of the
military occupation up to the exchange of ratifications of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain on April
i, 1899; during which period the island remained without
doubt a foreign country within the meaning of our domestic
tariff act, while the President had an equally undoubted bellig-
erent right to levy such contributions there as he saw fit.'
Second, that between the treaty of peace and the taking effect
of the Temporary Porto Rico Act' on May i, igoo; during which
period the Executive treated it as a foreign country, still held
only by belligerent right, continuing the system of military
contributions there, and collecting full duties at our home ports,
under claim of authority under the Dingley Tariff act,' upon
goods imported from the island. Third, the period now com-
mencing.
It is not my purpose to discuss the general features of the
new frame of government, which, while (if constitutional)
denying to the islanders American citizenship, puts them under
American tutelage and breaks off their past by abolishing even
their own Castilian name for their country," forcing them for
the future, in legal documents, to substitute a word of Portu-
guese derivation. I shall confine myself to those portions
which relate to duties upon imported and exported goods.
These duties, less cost of collection, are to be devoted to the
local purposes of the island. They are to continue only until
other provision is made by the local legislature, and in no
event after March i, 1902. Disregarding previsions of no
importance for the purposes of this paper, the provisions of the
' Fleming v. Page, 9 How. 6o3, 614-6, and auth. cit.
' Signed April 12, I9oo.




statute' are as follows: In general, foreign imports into Porto
Rico shall pay the same duties as foreign imports into "the
United States." Coffee, however, which enters our ports free
of charge, is to pay a small duty; while certain other articles,
dutiable here, are to be free. Commerce between Porto Rico
and "the United States" is to be dutiable at fifteen per cent of
the rates fixed by the Dingley Act.
The language is clear. It le.aves nothing but the constitu-
tional questions for judicial consideration, as to controversies
arising in the future. It bears, indeed, upon certain controver-
sies which have arisen in the past. It gives new legislative
recognition to the obvious distinction between merchandise
"coming into the United States from Porto Rico" and "like ar-
ticles of merchandise imported from foreign countries." It fully
recognizes the obvious fact that, as language is ordinarily used,
Porto Rico is not a foreign country, but a colony or dependency
of the United States, since April i i, 1899. But the Dingley Act'
levies no duties except upon "articles imported from foreign
countries;" and if the language now used by Congress is 'accu-
rate as well as clear, then all moneys collected by the Execu-
tive upon articles coming from Porto Rico, down to the very
recent time when its proceedings were ratified by Congress,-
were collected without authority of law. This question is-an
open one, but I shall confine myself to the discussion of purely
constitutional controversies.
,SEC. 2. That on and after the passage of this Act, the same tariffs,
customs, and duties shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all articles im-
ported into Porto Rico from ports other than those of the United States, which
are required by law to be collected upon articles imported into the United
States from foreign countries: Provided, That on all coffee in the bean or
ground imported into Porto Rico, there shall be levied and collected a duty of
five cents per pound, any law or part of law to the contrary notwithstanding:
And provided further, That all Spanish scientific, literary, and artistic works,
not subversive of public order in Porto Rico, shall be admitted free of duty
into Porto Rico for a period of ten years, reckoning from the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, as provided in said treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain: And provided further, That all books
and pamphlets printed in the English language shall be admitted into Porto
Rico free of duty when imported from the United States. SEC. 3. That on
and after the passage of this Act all merchandise coming into the United
States from Porto Rico, and coming into Porto Rico from the United States,
shall be entered at the several ports of entry upon payment of fifteen per
centum of the duties which are required to be levied, collected, and paid upon
like articles of merchandise imported from foreign countries * * ,
'Act of July 24, 1897. (30 Stat. i5i).
Act of March 24, 1900.
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In entering upon this discussion, it is necessary first to ex-
amine the precedents, judicial, legislative and executive. These
have been analyzed with so much thoroughness by others,' that
I shall state but briefly what seems to me to be the general
bearing of those which do not specially relate to tariff questions,
then taking up the latter more specifically.
There is doubt even as to the precise source of the power by
which we govern Porto Rico. The Constitution gives Congress
the power "to make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the territory or other property belonging to the United States;"
and in preparing one of his famous decisions, Chief Justice
Marshall was evidently first of the opinion that this clause was
the source of the power to govern territories acquired by
treaty. Further reflection, however, led him to question the
correctness of this assumption;' and there are many reasons to
believe that the clause quoted relates only to territory which
the Federal government owned or claimed to own in 1789.1'
If it is not applicable to territory subsequently acquired, .then
such territory is governed not by virtue of an express power,
but by virtue of a power implied from the power to acquire new
territory, itself implied from the power to make war and
treaties, and to admit new States. It has never been necessary
for the Supreme Court to decide the question. In either case
the power is subject to no specially prescribed limitations.
Whatever limitations it may have, if any, are to be found- else-
where in the body of the Constitution or amendments thereto.
What limitations may restrict our power to govern newly
acquired districts has been often a subject of judicial discus-
sion; and exaggerated weight is often placed by readers of such
discussion upon remarks to the effect that the power of Con-
gress is unlimited, remarks 'vhich were not intended to convey
any further idea than that Congress in their case possessed not
only the Federal powers, but those also which are exercised by
Besides the Congressional debates, special reference should be made
to the argument of Prof. C. C. Laugdell (x2 Harvard Law Rev. 365) on the
Imperialist side, and to those of Judge S. E. Baldwin (id. 393) and Mr. C. F.
Randolph (33 Congressional-Record, pp. 3791-9) opposed.
$American Insurance Co. v. Canter, i Pet. at pp. 542-3, 546.
0The fullest judicial treatment is in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 33,
432-447, 500-515, 604-615, a case now discredited as to the precise point decided,
but containing a large amount of very able and still valuable discussion, in the
opinions of Chief Justice Taney and of Justices Campbell and Curtis. As
showing the doubt belonging to this subject, see also United States v. Gratiot,
14 Pet. -526, 537; National Bank v. Yankton, xox U. S. 129, r32.
YALE LA IVJOURNAL.
a State within its own boundaries. Usually, the discussion has
related to the applicability of those constitutional amendments
which are commonly called the Bill of Rights. Certain judges
have used language indicating that the inhabitants of these
districts have no constitutional rights in the true sense of the
word, and that whatever restrictions Congress may observe are
morali rather than constitutional, in character; " but such lan-
guage has always been obiter, and opposed to the weight of
judicial authority. 2 I think that we may consider it as settled,
so far as anything which is disputed can be said to be settled,
that those provisions of the Constitution and of the early con-
stitutional amendments which prohibit infringement of indi-
vidual rights are absolute prohibitions, unqualified by any
restriction as to locality, and therefore operate as fully in the
territories-that is, in the territories which we had acquired
prior to 1898-as in the States. The language of the three last
amendments throws no light upon the subject, for they were
worded after this controversy had been long pending, and with
a view of avoiding ambiguity.
Notwithstanding past authorities, however, it is contended
by some that the question is still an open one. This conten-
tion is based upon the fact that every acquisition of territory
prior to 1898 was accompanied by some treaty stipulation giving
to the inhabitants of that territory the rights of United States
citizens. It is contended that it has never been necessary for
the decision of any case to consider whether newly acquired
districts are protected by any self-operating provisions of the
Cnstitution-that in every case the Constitution 'has been
expressly extended over the district by the treaty-making
power, and that this fact was sufficient to sustain the judgment
of the court. To this contention the answer given is, that the
Constitution is superior, not inferior, to the treaty-making
power; that a treaty is but a law, which can be repealed; that
if the Constitution were introduced only by force of a treaty
" Benner v. Porter, 9 How. 235, 242; Mormon Church v. United States,
136 U. S. 1, 44; and see also dubitantr, McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S.
174, i88; American Co. v. Fisher, 166 U. S. 464, 468. Endleman v. United
States, 86 Fed. Rep. 456,459, merely quotes, without necessity, the dicta of the
Benner case.
11 Murphy v. Ramsey, 1I4 U. S. x, 44, 45 and cas. cit.; Ex parte Boalman,
4 Cranch 75; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, x54; Callan v. Wilson,
127 U. S. 540, 55o; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. 'S. 343, 346; Springville v.
Thomas, x66 U. S. 707; Capital traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. z, s; and see
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 238.
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provision, it might be taken away again by a subsequent stat-
ute; that if the Constitution -did not exist of its own force in
any given district, a law (whether in the form of treaty or
statute) declaring it to exist would amount to no more
than a provision that its principles should govern until the
legislative or treaty-making power should otherwise enact;
and that such a law would be in so far repealed if any subse-
quent legislation should be in conflict with it. That a treaty
provision is repealed by subsequent statute, is no longer a mat-
ter of doubt." If we promise a foreign power upon cession of
territory that we will give to it, or to its citizens, or to the
inhabitants of the territory, any specified right, privilege or
immunity, we may break our promise, and as a general rule
our courts cannot intervene. The breach of the promise would
be a casus belli; but it would raise a political, not a judicial ques-
tion. To this answer the imperialists reply, however, that some
treaty provisions are self-executing, and so vest rights which
cannot be taken away by subsequent legislation; that (as they
claim) the provisions of our former annexation treaties are of
this character; and that the judicial decisions upon the opera-
tion of the Constitution in districts thus ceded should be based
upon this ground. It is undoubtedly true that a treaty, like a
statute, may be so worded as to vest rights by its own inherent
force, without the aid of any subsequent legislation or judicial
proceedings. It may vest title to lands, so that they cannot be
taken away afterwards without just compensation. It may
operate as a general naturalization law, giving to the inhab-
itants of a ceded territory the full rights of American citizens.
Whether the past judicial authorities upon the question of the
application of the Bill of Rights in our territories will be abso-
lutely controlling upon cases arising in Porto Rico, or whether
each will have merely the weight due to a carefully considered
judicial opinion upon a point not necessary to the decision of
the case under consideration by the court, will depend upon the
construction of certain treaty provisions.
Moreover, it is arguable that the absolute prohibitions upon
legislative action which are contained in the Bill of Rights
might be held applicable to our new possessions, without its
necessarily following that the clauses in the original consti-
tution restricting the legislative power of taxation are equally
Is Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U. S. 19o; Chinese Exclusion Case i3o U. S.
-58r.
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applicable, especially the clause requiring certain forms of taxa-
tion to be uniform throughout the United States.
On the other hand, there are grave reasons for holding this
"uniformity clause" applicable to the territories, which do not
exist in the case of the other prohibitions. Such a holding
may be necessary for the protection of the States, which are
entitled to demand that the duties levied upon them shall be
no greater than those levied in the districts immediately under
the care and at the expense of the whole nation. This is no
fanciful illustration. Already there are exemptions granted
to Porto Rico which are not conceded to the States, while it is
seriously proposed, as a means of maintaining the policy of the
" open door" in the Far East, to permit entry of foreign goods
into the Philippines at rates far below those charged in the
ports of our States. It is admitted by most administration
leaders that what can be done in the Philippines can be done in
New Mexico and Arizona; and, therefore, if the uniformity
clause does not apply to the commerce of the territories, Con-
gress might encourage the trade of New Mexico and Arizona at
the expense of the trade of California and Texas. The danger
here may be slight; but it was the precise danger feared by the
framers of the Constitution.
I will now consider the precedents bearing directly upon
the right of taxation in organized or unorganized territories
of the United States, taking them up-whether they be judicial,
executive or legislative-in their chronological order; but
wvithout cataloguing the diverse views of individual statesmen,
journalists and counsel, from time to time.
Much stress has been laid upon the fact that our first Cus-
toms Administration Acts" provided no machinery for the col-
lection of duties upon merchandise imported into the territo-
ries; and this has been spoken of as if it were a contempoianeous
practical construction of the Constitution, proving that duties
were not expected to be uniform except among the States them-
selves. This supposition is due to imperfect knowledge of the
provisions of those acts Neither of the territories then exist-
ing bordered upon the sea; and the only port where merchan-
dise was permitted to be imported otherwise than by sea was
the port of Louisville in the State of Virginia (later of Ken-
tucky)." This was indeed a discrimination in favor of a single
4Act of July 31, 1789 (1 Stat. 29); Act of August 4, 1790 (1 Stat. 145).
15 1 Stat. 48; Id. 177.
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port, but it was a discrimination permitted by the Constitution,"
and hence there could not lawfully be any duties in the terri-
tories to collect.
It has also been urged that under our first excise laws no
tax collectors were provided for the territories. This fact is
entitled to consideration, although it is probably susceptible of
explanation without affecting any constitutional argument.
The first excise was a provision inserted in a tariff law, to be
collected by the machinery provided for collection of certain
tariff duties;- and tariff duties, as I have pointed out, were not
operative in the territories because nobody could import goods
there. Our early excises would very likely have given no
return sufficient to warrant the establishment of any machinery
for collection there; and even if the omission to provide for
collection bureaus in the territories was deliberate, we should
wish to know the motive before giving a constitutional interpre-
tation to what may have been merely good fiscal management.
In i799, when the territories had begun to be commercially
important, the machinery for collection of duties was extended
to include them;'8 and they have been included practically, as
well as theoretically, in the operation of the uniformity clause
ever since.
During the first decade of our constitutional history, how-
ever, we find a most striking confirmation of the theory of
the applicability of this provision to the territories, in the
corresponding provision concerning naturalization. Elsewhere
in the Constitution Congress is empowered "to establish an
uniform rule of naturalization and uniform laws on the subject
of bankruptcy throughout the United States." The first
naturalization law was passed by the First Congress, in I79o, and
conferred its benefits upon* all aliens who for the prescribed
periods "shall have resided within the limits and under the
jurisdiction of the United States." It, however, assumed that
the alien would have resided in "one of the States," the North-
west Territory being then so sparsely populated that it was
evidently overlooked." In 1795, however, a new naturalization
law was passed, with a preamble stating that it was "for carry-
ing into complete effect the power given by the Constitution to
establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the
United States." This act gave the naturalizing power to the
"6 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co., i8 How. 4x, 43.
11 Act of March 3, 1791 (I Stat. 199. 200).
Is Customs Administration Act of March 2, 1799 (1 Stat. 627. 637-9).
'$Act of March 26, 1790 (1 Stat. 1o3).
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courts "of the States or of the territories Northwest or South of
the River Ohio"; and provided that the applicant should have
"resided within the United States five years at least, and with-
in the State or territory where such court is at the time held,
one year at least." The alien cannot be naturalized unless the
court is "satisfied that he has resided within the limits and
under the jurisdiction of the United States five years"
and is "attached to the principles of the Constitution of the
United States."2 °  We have thus an almost contemporary
construction of the meaning of these uniformity
clauses; and the weight of such a construction must be almost,
if not quite, conclusive.2  The first bankruptcy law contains
some language inapplicable to the territories, and is to be
administered by judges of the district courts of the United
States.2 Whether this term includes the territorial courts of
that time2  does not seem to have been decided, and I am not
informed of the practice under the act. It was very soon
repealed,' so that the matter, in view of the then sparse
population of the territories, is of no great weight.
New questions arose with the treaty of 1803, by which
Louisiana was ceded to the Union. That treaty provided that
for a period of twelve years goods imported into Louisiana in
French and Spanish vessels, coming from ports of their own
countries, should pay no greater rate of duties than goods
imported in vessels of the United States."' The treaty provoked
memorable debates in both Houses of Congress upon the consti-
tutional questions involved. It brought up for the first time
the question of our right to acquire new territory, as well as
the question how the new territory could he governed. The
debates were very short, however, since there was need of most
immediate action. The constitutional discussion in the House
of Representatives occupied a single day; and not until it was
half over did Roger Griswold, a Federalist leader in Connecti-
cut, raise the point that the special privilege to French and
Spanish vessels was a violation of the uniformity clause of the
Constitution, since the treaty provided that Louisiana should be
part of the United States, so that the duties there paid should
be uniform with those paid elsewhere." The point received
10 Act of January 29, 1795 (1 Stat. 414).
2 The Laura, 114 U. S. 411, 416.
"Act of Apri1 4, 18o0 (2 Stat. 19).
"See z Stat 51;2 Stat. 9o.
"Act of December ig, '8o3 (2 Stat. 248).
"8 Stat. 204.
"Annals of Congress, October 25, 18o3, pp. 463-4.
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little attention, and the treaty was approved by an overwhelm-
ing majority. In answer to ahother and clearly untenable con-
stitutional objection to the same treaty provision, while some
administration leaders denied that the commerce of the new
territory would be subject to the Constitution, John Randolph
of Virginia took the ground that this special privilege was
defensible, because it was part of the price which we paid for
the territory, which came to us subject to a restriction; but
that if it violated the Constitution, a remedy could be found by
giving the French and Spanish vessels a similar twelve years,
privilege in our other ports."' The last point was certainly a
good one. The treaty provision was subsequently confirmed
by statute; and the fact that no French or Spanish importer
claimed the benefit of the Constitution in any of the ports of
the older States is entitled to no practical weight, as customs
cases did not find their way into our courts until long after the
expiration of this period." Too great stress can easily be laid
on such omissions. Even now there is a plain violation of
the uniformity clause on our statute book which has stood there
for nearly thirty-five years without question, so far as I am
informed. "
Possession of Louisiana, under this treaty, was not taken
until December 20, 1803. It was announced to Congress on
January i6, i8o4. The act extending our customs revenue sys-
tem to Louisiana was approved February 24, and went into
effect thirty days later, or about three months after the new
-territory came actually into our control.'" During this period
the Treasury Department seems to have ruled that imports
therefrom were subject to duty." The amount of these imports
must have been but small. The Secretary of the Treasury,
Albert Gallatin, was not a lawyer, although a most able finan-
cier; and he was struggling with most important and intricate
questions relating to the fiscal management of the new posses-
sion. His omission to raise and sustain the constitutional point
is a precedent for the Imperialists, for what it may be worth.
Florida was the next addition to our possessions. The
treaty of cession was ratified February 19, i82i. It contained
a twelve years' privilege like that of the Louisiana treaty."
11 Id., pp. 437-8, 456-7.
"The right to recover duties overpaid was not established untl 1836
(Elliott v. Swartwout, xo Pet 137).
"Rev. St., Sec. 3114.
30 Stat. 251, 254.
' 1 Mayo io4; but see Cross v. Harrison, infra.
28 Stat. 262.
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The temporary act extending our customs revenue system over
the new territory was approved March 3, i82i." This act recog-
nizes Florida as part of the United States, and conforms to the
uniformity clause of the Constitution. Possession had not yet
been taken. The question subsequently arose whether Florida
became actually a part of the United States for revenue purposes
when the treaty was ratified, or when possession was delivered.
Attorney General Wirt in the case of The Olive Branch"
ruled upon the latter theory, holding goods dutiable which
were shipped from St. Augustine on July z4, 1821, possession
not having been delivered until July 17.
In 182o, during the period between the signing and the rati-
fication of the Florida treaty, the case of Loughborough v.
Blake"5 came before the Supreme Court. It raised the ques-
tion whether Congress had the right to impose a direct tax
upon the District of Columbia. It was not necessary to the
decision of this case to decide whether the uniformity clause
of the Constitution applies to the territories and the District
of Columbia. That question was, however, considered by
Chief Justice Marshall, and he gave the weight of his great
name to the proposition that the words "United States" in
the uniformity clause include not merely the States, but the
whole "of the American Empire."" This was only a dctum,
but it was a dictum of high authority.
u3 Stat. 639.
" A. G. Op. 483.
5 Wheat. 317.
1"This grant [of the taxing power] is general, without limitation as to
place. It consequently extends to all places over which the government
extends. If this could be doubted, the doubt is removed by the subsequent
words which modify the grant. These words are "but all duties, imposts,
and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United States." It will not be
contended, that the modification of the power extends to places to which the
power itself does not extend. The power, then, to lay and collect duties,
imposts and excises may be exercised, and must be exercised throughout the
United States. Does this term designate the whole, or any particular portion
of the American empire? Certainly this question can admit of but one
answer. It is the name given to our great republic, which is composed of
States and Territories. The District of Columbia, or the territory west of the
Missouri, is not less within the United States, than Maryland or Pennsylvania;
and it is not less necessary, on the principles of our Constitution, that uniformity
in the imposition of imposts, duties, and excises should be observed in the one
than in the other. Since, then, the power to lay and collect taxes, which
includes direct taxes, is obviously co-extensive 'with the power to Jay and col-
lect duties, imposts, and excises, and since the latter extends throughout the-
United States, it follows, that the power to impose direct taxes also extends
throughout the United States." (5 Wheat. at pp. 318-19.)
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In March, 1845, Congress passed a joint resolution for the
annexation of Texas, then an independent republic. The matter
remained executory at the time of the final adjournment of
Congress. The question was raised during the summer, whether
goods imported from Texas were dutiable. Robert J. Walker,
Secretary of the Treasury, . held that they were dutiable
until further action by Congress, although the resolutions hadbeen approved by the Texan Government." The Supreme Court
afterwards held that the date of the admission of Texas to the
Union was December 29, x845," thus impliedly sustaining the
Secretary's decision.
California was ceded to the Union by the Treaty of Guada-
lupe Hidalgo, ratified May 30, 1848. It was then held in military
possession. The cession was not made in express words, but
impliedly by readjustment of the boundary line." Congress
was in session at the time, but adjourned without providing for
the extension of the customs revenue system over the newly
annexed territory. It recognized the fact of annexation only
by establishing mail routes and providing that two postal agents
should go out to California and organize the postal system
there.4 ' The question was thus squarely presented to the Execu-
tive Department for consideration, whether duties were prop-
erly leviable upon imports from newly acquired territories, as
to whose revenue matters Congress had not yet legislated, into
the States of the Union; and also whether, under the language
of the tariff law (which so far as material was then the same as
now)" the same rates of duties must be levied in California as
in the States. President Polk and his Cabinet evidently ex-
amined the constitutional questions with the greatest care.
They decided, and Secretary Buchanan announced to the people
of California through one of the postal agents, that the govern-
ment by belligerent right had ceased upon the ratification of
the treaty of cession; that the former military government
thereafter continued in power as a de facto government, until
Congress should otherwise provide; that the war tariff, which
had been established by that government in California, had
been superseded by the general tariff law: and that no duties
were leviable on goods imported from California into the
31 Mayo, 375.
38 Calkin v. Cocke, 14 How. 227.
399 Stat. 926, 929.
40 9 Stat. 320.
41 Levying duties on "all articles imported from foreign countries" (9 Stat.42)_
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States." This was but a decision of the Executive Department,
but it was very carefully considered, and is entitled to some
weight. I know of no evidence that the slavery question had
anything to do with it." It is especially interesting, because
there was no language in the treaty, and no legislation by Con-
gress, which provided for the immediate extension of the Con-
stitution over the new territory." Even the promise to give its
inhabitants the rights of citizens was an executory one."'
At the December term, 1849, the Supreme Court decided
the famous case of Fleming v. Page," so much relied upon by
the Imperialists. The point decided was a simple one, and the
ground of decision indisputable. During the Mexican war we
held the Mexican State of Tamaulipas in military occupation
for a long period. During that period certain goods were
imported from that State into Philadelphia, and were there
claimed to be free from duty on the ground that Tamaulipas
was a part of the United States. It was undoubtedly a part of
the United States for many purposes in theory of international
law." The court very properly held, however, that the Presi-
dent, as Commander-in-Chief of the armies of the United
States, had no constitutional power to extend the boundaries of
the country; that this could be done only by act of Congress or
by treaty; and, therefore, that under our Constitution the State
of Tamaulipas was still to be regarded as a foreign country.
Chief Justice Taney went on, however, to make some entirely
unnecessary xemarks about the practice of the Treasury Depart-
ment in regard to the cessions of Florida and Louisiana;
"Quoted in Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. at pp. 184-5.
"The peculiarity and the error of Calhoun's doctrine was not that it
made the Constitution at once operate in new territory, but that it read into
the Constitution a guaranty of the institution of slavery. The weakness of
his opponents' position was that they went too far, and sacrificed the constitu-
tional guaranties which did and do exist.
"It is a misapprehension to suppose that international law prevents the
Constitution from operating in ceded territory until Congress legislates. Inter-
national law is not law at all in any land except so far as it is a part of the
municipal law of that land, and, like our statutes, it is subordinate to the
Constitution, which comes into operation at once. "Every nation acquiring
territory by treaty or'otherwise must hold it subject to the Constitution and
laws of its own government." (Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 225;
Chicago, Rock Island, etc., Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542, 546.)
49 Stat. 930.
469 How. 6o3.
41 Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; The Foltina, i Dod.
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remarks which, so far as applicable to the tariff question, seem
plainly erroneous. He says ihat after the United States had
taken possession of Pensacola under the Florida cession, goods
imported from that port "before an act of Congress was passed
erecting it into a collection district, and authorizing the
appointment of a collector, were liable to duty." But, as we
have seen, Congress had made these necessary provisions
before the United States took possession. The Chief Justice's
statement seems to be taken from Secretary Walker's Texas
circular above referred to;" but the ruling therein discussed is
there stated to have been made in x8ig, when somebody seems to
have made the untenable claim that Florida was part of the
United States because the treaty had been signed, although it
had not yet been ratified. The Chief Justice goes on to say that
the decision which he refers to "was sanctioned at the time by
the Attorney General "; but there is no such ruling to be found
in the printed reports of the Attorney General's opinions.
There is some ground for belief that the Chief Justice was
making a mistaken reference to the case of the Olive Branch."
The Chief Justice's further remarks relate to the Treasury
practice in granting clearances in the coasting trade; and this
is immaterial for our purposes, since the constitutional pro-
vision against preference to the ports of any State has clearly
no operation in a territory.
Cross v. Harrison" involved the legality of the duties col-
lected by the California de facto government between the date
of the treaty of cession and the date when the. regularly
appointed collector of customs entered upon the duties of his
office. It was an action brought against the defacto collector to
recover duties paid to him under protest. The duties collected,
as I have stated, were at the rates provided in the local
war tariff up to the date when news of the ratification of the
treaty of peace reached California, and after that time at the
rates provided by the general tariff law of the United States.
Mr. Justice Wayne, in the opinion of the court, recites at length
the proceedings of the Polk administration in California after
the treaty, quoting at length from the constitutional arguments
of Secretary Buchanan to the effect that California was under a
defacto government, succeeding the government based upon bel-
ligerent right,and that it was part of the United States within the
4s x Mayo 375.
4" See remark of Daniel Webster, 9 How. at p. 613.
Si6 How. 164.
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meaning of the tariff clause of the Constitution. He also quotes
Secretary Walker's ruling that the Treasury Department had
been given no power to collect duties in California, so that their
collection had to remain in charge of the War Department,
which was conducting the de facto government. The court
decided that the imposition of the regular duties, as soon as the
fact of the cession of California became known, was rightful and
correct; that it was perfectly proper to collect duties under the
local war tariff until the fact of cession was known; that the
landing of goods free of duty at any place out of a collection
district "would be a violation of that provision in the Consti-
tution which enjoins that all duties, imposts and excises shall
be uniform throughout the United States"; that "the ratifica-
tions of the treaty made California a part of the United States;
and that as soon as it became so, the territory became subject
to the acts which were in force to regulate foreign commerce
with the United States, after those had ceased which had been
instituted for its regulation as a belligerent right"; and that
Congress has since ratified all of the acts of the defacto govern-
ment, including those of the Collector. Counsel for the import-
ers claimed that it had not been the practice of the United
States to collect duties in such cases until Congress had legis-
lated, citing the Fleming case, and also relying upon the prece-
dents of Louisiana and Florida.2 Mr. Justice Wayne, after dis-
cussing the latter precedents, says that" there was no interval in
either instance where duties were not collected upon foreign
importations, because Congress had not legislated for it to be
done." 12
Much of the argument in Cross v. Harrison was not neces-
sary to the decision. The case might have been disposed of by
saying simply that Congress had ratified everything done, and
that the constitutional question was immaterial, because the
voluntary action of the Executive had directed precisely what
the Constitution, if applicable, would have required. But it still
remains true that the deliberate decision of the Polk adminis-
tration upon this constitutional question was carefully and
thoroughly reviewed, and fully approved, by a unanimous deci-
sion of the Supreme Court rendered after a most elaborate
argument, and in view of all the legislative and executive pre-
cedents; and rendered in the case of a still unorganized terri-
tory, which was protected by no self-operative treaty provision
R' x6 How. at pp. 174-6.
Id. at p. 2oo.
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or statute. While such a decision is not absolutely controlling, it
shows the weight of authority to be altogether on the side of
those maintaining that the uniformity clause, at least, of the
Constitution, extends trotrio vigore over all territory ceded to
the United States.
In x868, immediately after the cession of Alaska to the
United States, the principle of Cross v. Harrison was. followed
by the Treasury Department without question," and goods
shipped from Alaska to our ports were therefore held entitled
to admission free of duty.
The present administration has reversed the California prece-
dent. No judicial decision upon its action has as yet been pro-
cured. The Board of General Appraisers, a quasi judicial
tribunal in the Treasury Department, has written an opinion
upon the subject, sustaining the action of the administration;
but the opinion seems to me to be based upon a misunderstand-
ing of the historical precedents, and unless a recent well known
opinion of the Supreme Court"' is to be overruled in principle,
the Board was altogether without jurisdiction in the premises,
since the importers who brought the case before it had to con-
cede for the purposes of the case, by so doing, that the Island
of Porto Rico was a foreign country, which was the only
question for decision.
In discussing the application of the uniformity clause of the
Constitution to special cases which have come up from time to
time, where the existence of uniformity has been challenged,
justices have used expressions in opinions to the effect that the
requirement of uniformity, while held by them to be geograph-
ical in character, requires only that the rate of duty should be
no greater in one State than in any other State, and similar
expressions have been used by constitutional writers.' In the
cases referred to, however, no question was raised as to the
operation of these taxes in the territories; all duties, imposts
and excises, on the other hand, since the beginning of our
" Syn. Dec. Treas. Dept. i868, pp. 10, 20.
Syn. Dec. Treas. Dept., Feb. x4, goo. No. 22018.
u In re Fassett, 142 U. S. 479, 487.
" Income Tax Case, 5 D. C. App. at p. 421; 157 U. S. at p. 593; 1 Story on
the Constitution, § 957. Discrimination between States was doubtless the
main evil aimed at, but Mr. Justice Story, who first pointed this out, also gives
his full endorsement to Loughborough v. Blake (§ 999), and we shall see that
the framers of the Constitution felt under the fullest obligation to treat the
inhabitants of the then existing territory upon an equal footing with those of
the States.
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government, have been laid upon States and territories alike;
and the use of the expressions which I have referred to, being
sufficient and entirely proper so far as the disposition of the
cases then before the courts were concerned, cannot properly
be regarded as having any controlling influence upon a ques-
tion not before the court." "We take it to be a sound principle
that no proposition of law can be said to be overruled by a
court, which was not in the mind of the court when the decision
was made."'"
Stress has been laid by some upon the fact that there are so
many clauses in statutes and treaties extending the laws of the
United States to newly acquired territory, and extending the
rights of United States citizens to their inhabitants. Little
weight can properly be attached to such clauses. It is very
proper to insert them for greater caution, and if the absence of
a constitutional right, unless expressly granted by law, could be
inferred from the fact that it is common to specially recognize
it in drafting statutes, our constitutional system would be
thrown into considerable confusion.
Thus much for the past precedents. So far as they go, their
weight is against the Imperialist theory, and in favor of the
position that Porto Rico upon April ii, 1899, became a part of
the United States, at least enough so, to entitle it to the benefit
of the uniformity clause of the Constitution. Let us now
assume, however, that they will be distinguished upon the
ground that they are sustainable upon special treaty provisions
of those times, or upon other grounds not material to the
present controversy. Let us then examine the questions
raised by the Porto Rico tariffs as original questions, uncon-
trolled by precedents, and to be solved by an examination of
the Constitution itself.
It is now often said that the Constitution does not extend to
Porto Rico. This is certainly an inaccurate form of expression.
Neither Congress nor the Executive has any lawful power any-
where except from the Constitution. The sovereignty of the
United States resides in its people, not in its officials. When
the President as Commander-in-Chief invades a foreign
country, he is bound only by the limitations of civilized war-
fare, but that is because the people, through the Constitution,
have given him a power subject only to those limitations. He
51 Pollock v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., ,57 U. S. at pp. 574-5 and
cases cited.
" Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall, 123, 133.
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conducts courts in semi-civilized countries, putting criminals
to death without benefit of jury; but while the Bill of Rights
does not operate there, where the sovereignty belongs to a
foreign ruler under whose permission the courts are organized,
the President's acceptance of that permission is by authority
from us, speaking through the Constitution. If the flag goes
anywhere without the Constitution, it goes unaccompanied by
any authority from the people of the United States.
The Constitution does extend to Porto Rico. Implied
powers under the Constitution are the sole authority for our
government there, and the sole authority for the taxes which
we have paid to maintain that government. The problem to
be solved is not whether the Constitution extends there, but
which of its provisions are operative to restrict legislative and
Executive action in regard to the island and its inhabitants.
The questions thus to be solved are as follows: First,
whether goods imported from foreign countries into Porto Rico
can be subjected to duties for the benefit of the United States
Treasury, at rates different from those levied upon goods
imported from foreign countries into the States of the Union;
second, whether goods imported from Porto Rico into the
States of the Union can be subjected to the payment of duties
to be covered into the Treasury of the United States; third,
whether goods imported from the States of the Union into Porto
Rico can be so subjected; fourth, (if the answer to the previous
questions be in the negative), whether these various duties are
validated by being covered into the local treasury of Porto
Rico, instead of into the general treasury of the United States.
The answer to the first question depends upon the construc-
tion of the following constitutional provision: "The Congress
shall have power to lay -and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and
excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense
and the general welfare of the United States; but all duties,
imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States." The last clause of this provision is commonly called
the "unifotmity clause" of the Constitution. It will be noticed
that the clause is not entirely independent, but a limitation
upon the taxing power. What is the meaning of "United
States" in the uniformity clause ? Plainly, it seems to me, the
same as the meaning of "United States" in the clause preced-
ing. Whatever variation may or may not exist in the meaning
of "United States" in other portions of the Constitution, or of
the amendments thereto, I think that it would be an unjust
reflection upon the draftsmen of that instrument to say that
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they were guilty of using it twice in this paragraph with dif-
ferent meanings. What, then, is the "United States," through-
out which all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform?
Plainly, it seems to me, the same "United States" for whose
common defence, and for whose general welfare, Congress may
exercise the taxing power. If Porto Rico is not so far within
the United States that duties levied there must be uniform with
those levied elsewhere, then it is no part of the "United States"
which Congress may tax us to defend. The word "through-
out" shows that the "United States" for whose welfare tax-
ation can be imposed, is not a mere intangible idea-a mere
personification of the national sovereignty-but a geographical
as well as a political fact; that it is something which can be
pointed out upon a map; and I think that the map upon which
it can be pointed out is what we hang upon our walls and call
the map of the United States. Nor do I think that the mean-
ing of the Constitution must now be changed, just because our
boundaries have become too extended and too complicated to
be conveniently shown upon a single map.
And here I may allude to what seems to me a very singular
misapprehension of one of the ablest of Imperialist constitu-
tional lawyers." If territory annexed becomes a part of the
United States, he asks '.where is to be found the power to dis-
pose of it," saying that it could no more be ceded to a foreign
country than one of the States could be. I answer, first, that if
the territorial clause of the Constitution applies to territory
acquired since ISoo, then there is an express power to dispose
of it; second, that in any case the power to acquire territory
implies the power to dispose of it; third, that even a portion of
a State can be ceded to a foreign government if the State gives
its consent that the cession be made." This would not; of
course, deprive the inhabitants of the ceded district of their
election to retain United States citizenship.
It is an interesting fact that, while duties, imposts and
excises are to be "uniform throughout the United States,"
direct taxes are to be "apportioned among the several States,"
thus not making it obligatory upon Congress to impose that
class of taxes upon the territories also. This distinction was
noticed by Chief Justice Marshall; and while holding that
59 John C. Spooner in the.Senate, April 2, 1900.
60See Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, ixr4 U. S. 525, 541; Geofroy
v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 267, referring to the cession of a part of Maine to Great
Britain in 1842, to settle a boundary dispute.
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direct taxes might be levied in the territories at the option of
Congress, he suggested as a reason for not having made the
extension of every general direct tax to the territories obliga-
tory upon Congress, that the cost of collection of such tax
might be greater than the amount collcted."
It is altogether probable that the framers of the Constitu-
tion had the territories in mind in the drafting of these sections.
The Northwest Territorial Government was established by the
Continental Congress by the famous Ordinance of July 13,
1787," and was known to the Constitutional Convention shortly
thereafter. The Ordinance declared itself to be a "compact
between the original States and the people and States in the
said territory," " unalterable except by common consent; and it
specially provided that the inhabitants of the territory should
be subject to pay their share of the debts and expenses of the
Federal Government, "to be apportioned on them by Congress,
according to the same common rule and measure by which
apportionments thereof shall be made on the other States.""
However deficient the power of the Continental Congress to
enter into" this compact may have been, it was regarded by all
as sacred, and was promptly confirmed by the first Congress
under the Constitution."
Comparison with other clauses of the Constitution tends to
confirm the view that the "United States'" as used in the tax-
ing clause includes the entire territory for whose defense and
welfare the Federal Government is established, whether or not
that territory may be within the limits of a State. The phrase
"citizen of the United States" appears frequently in the Con-
stitution, and it has never been seriously doubted until of late
that a decree of naturalization, which constitutes one a citizen
of the United States, may be granted in a territory, and may
thus constitute one a citizen of the United States who is not
a citizen of any State." The power of naturalization is also
contained in a "uniformity clause." That this uniformity must
prevail throughout the territories, as well as throughout the
States, I have already shown to be the settled practical con-
struction of the Constitution.
61 Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. at p. 323.
9 1 Stat. 51, note; Rev. St., ed. 1878, p. 13.6 3 Ordinance of 1787, § 14.
"Ordinance of 1787, Article IV.
"x Stat. 50.
"This was conceded in the Louisiana debate of 18o3 by one of the admin-
istration leaders of the Senate, the famous John Taylor of Carolina.
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Much has been made by the Imperialists of the ruling origi-
nating with Chief Justice Marshall,' 7 and since steadfastly
adhered to, that the territorial courts are not organized under
the judiciary article of the Constitution, so that it is not neces-
sary that their judges should hold their offices during good
behavior. The foundation of this ruling must be found, how-
ever, in the peculiar language of the judiciary article. That
article does not require that all the judges of courts of the
United States should hold office during good behavior. It pro-
vides that the "judicial power of the United States" should
be vested in certain courts, the tenure of whose judges should
be as stated. It then proceeds to define this "judicial power,"
and its definition excludes a very large class of cases arising in
the territories-such as common .law and equity cases arising
there, which are not founded upon any provision of statute or
treaty. Evidently, therefore, the courts established by the
judiciary article are not sufficient to give the requisite protec-
tion to inhabitants of the territories or of the District of Colum-
bia; and their protection must be found in the general and
exclusive power of Congress to legislate in all their matters.
The ruling of the Supreme Court upon this point has not been
regarded by the majority of subsequent rulings of that court as
excluding the territories from the protection of other clauses
of the Constitution.
Mainly for the above reasons, I believe that the uniformity
clause of the Constitution should be construed to apply to
Porto Rico, as well as to Connecticut or New York; and that what-
ever duties are levied in New York upon goods coming from
foreign ports should be equally levied in Porto Rico, and
devoted to the common defence and general welfare of the
whole United States, although they may of course be specially
appropriated for the benefit of Porto Rico.
If, then, Porto Rico be part of the United States within the
uniformity clause of the Constitution, it follows that the second
and third questions must be answered in the negative, as well
as the first. Duties are not uniform throughout the United
States if they are levied upon commerce between the States
and Porto Rico, while they are not levied upon commerce
between the States and Arizona or Alaska.
Even were Porto Rico no part of the United States, an article
"imported from the United States" into the island, as the sec-
"lAmerican Insurance Co. v. Canter, i Pet. 5i.
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ond section of the new law puts it, would not be dutiable. Its
departure from our coast and arrival at the island are parts of
a single commercial transaction. While it is an import there,
it is an export here. By a plain and express constitutional
prohibition, "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported
from any State "; and it has been well said that "the United
States cannot, by transferring the place of collection, change
the character of the tax that may be levied and collected.","
Hence the article is not taxable if it is exported from any
State within the meaning of the prohibition. It certainly is an
export from a State in the ordinary meaning of the English
language, whatever kind of a dependency Porto Rico may be;
and there is no doubt that all exports to foreign countries are
within the prohibition. The Executive, by ruling Porto Rico
to be a "foreign country" within the meaning of the Dingley
Tariff Act, hence put itself in the position of violating an
express prohibition in the Constitution of the United States
every time that it collected these duties in Porto Rico-a pro--
hibition which undoubtedly applied to the case, for it was the
rights of a State, not a territory, which were infringed.
If, however, Porto Rico is not a "foreign country," and if
on this account the export clause is inapplicable, then it fol-
lows, under the authorities, that Congress has not received the
power to tax this branch of commerce. There are no decisions
in point under the clause prohibiting Congress from taxing
exports, but there is authority upon the clause placing a similar
prohibition upon the States. This clause came up for examina-
tion in t86o in Almy v. California," a case involving a State tax
affecting articles exported from California to New York. It
was objected to as a regulation of inter-State commerce and as
a tax upon exports. So able a counsel as Judah P. Benjamin
seems to have conceded that the articles were exported within
the meaning of the Constitution, endeavoring to evade the pro-
hibition by arguments immaterial here. The Supreme Court
unanimously held them to be exports and based their decision
upon that ground alone. In i868 a similar question came up
again in Woodruff v. Parham,"0 which overruled the former
case upon the point decided (one justice strongly dissenting)
and held that goods exported from one State to another are
68Wiliam Lindsay in the Senate, March 9, i9o; compare Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 437, 440; Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 132.
"24 How. x6g.
- 8 Wall. 123.
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not exports within the constitutional prohibition. The reason-
ing of the court, however, is as fatal to the tax which we are
considering as if it had sustained the Almy case. The point
was, of course, urged, that if goods sent from one State to
another are not "exports," then Congress has power to tax
inter-State commerce to any extent. Mr. Justice Miller, how-
ever, replied that Congress has no right to tax exports of any
kind except under its right to levy "imposts "; that the word
"imposts," as used in the Constitution, gives no right to lay
duties on inter-State commerce; that hence "we have, in the
power to lay duties on imports from abroad, and the prohibition
to lay such duties on exports to other countries, the power and
its limitations concerning imposts." " Hence this dilemma: If
Porto Rico is "abroad," to be ranked among "other countries,"
the tax on exports thereto is expressly forbidden. If Porto
Rico is not "abroad," among "other countries," then the tax is
void for lack of power.
The fourth question still remains for examination-whether
Congress has remedied any of these defects by turning the pro-
ceeds of taxation into the local treasury of Porto Rico, to be
expended for local purposes.
The uniformity clause of the Constitution is in form a limi-
tation upon the clause which grants a taxing power "for the
common defense, and general welfare of the United States.""
Congress has an independent taxing power in the territories
and District of Columbia, to be exercised for local purposes."
Is the uniformity clause to be construed as a limitation upon this
local power of taxation also? I do not think that this is a
necessary construction. If, in addition to the uniform duties,
imposts and excises, which operate throughout what Marshall
called "the American Empire," Congress shall impose duties
as well as direct taxes, to be collected in the territories and
devoted to the necessities of their government, I do not see
that the uniformity clause is violated. The main resource of
our territorial treasuries has always been direct taxation; but
they thrive also upon a system of license fees upon occupations,
which are duties or excises,"' which could not be levied by
18 Wall. at p. 132.
"The debts referred to in the same sentence are the debts incurred prior
to 1789, which have long since been paid.
13 Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317.
"1 See Ficklen v. Shelby County, i45 U. S. , 23-4; Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
and Trust Co.,. 157 U. S. at pp. 576-8, and cas. cit.; Woodruff v. Parham. 8
Wall. 123, 133.
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Congress in a single State, but whose constitutionality has
never been doubted, so far as I am aware.
Hence I can not perceive that the five per cent. duty on
coffee, levied in Porto Rico for local purposes, is a violation of
the Constitution, although coffee is admitted free of duty into
the States of the Union. The exemption of Spanish and
English literature, however, so far as it is not shared by the
States, seems to be unconstitutional and void; for Congress can
not make imposts lighter in territories than in States. The
immediate covering of the foreign import duties into the local
treasury of the island seems to be unobjectionable. Under the
uniformity clause they must be regarded as collected for the
common defense and general welfare, but if they were for-
warded to the national treasury, they could be at once appro-
priated for Porto Rico and sent back again-a useless circuity.
But taxation of imports from the States of the Union into
Porto Rico is of very questionable validity, whatever be done
with the proceeds collected, and whether or not the island be
part of the "United States." The prohibition against taxation
of exports is not in form a limitation upon any particular grant
of power. It is an absolute prohibition, without exceptions.
Now it has never been held that either Congress or a State can
tax exports to a territory. The courts have only considered
the cases of inter-State and foreign commerce. It is altogether
probable that the doctrine of Mr. Justice Miller will be adhered
to by the Supreme Court, and applied to the clause prohibiting
the taxation of exports by Congress, although perhaps not
absolutely impossible that the court may retrace its steps and
apply the older doctrine. It is altogether probable, in other
words, that the court will never apply the prohibition to inter-
State commerce, nor yet to. commerce between the States and
the immediately contiguous territories. The restricted mean-
ing thus given to the word, however, is based upon its common
usage; and I think that few would ever have hesitated to say
that goods sent to a land far beyond seas, like Alaska, Hawaii
or Porto Rico, are exports in the narrowest sense of the word,
and within the mischief which our forefathers sought to avert.
Hence it seems reasonable to expect that the export trade to
our new outlying dominions will be freed from these duties.
There is no prohibition upon the taxation of exports from a
territory for local purposes, and if Congress had laid an export
tax upon goods about to be shipped from Porto Rico to our
ports its legality might have been sustained. It may be sug-
gested that the reasoning applied to exports from our ports into
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Porto Rico would apply here also, and that the transference of
the place of collection from the point of departure to that of
arrival does not change the character of the tax. The duty is
objectionable, however, upon another ground. When the tax
on exports from Porto Rico is laid here, and to be paid by us,
it is unconstitutional because there is no power to tax us for the
local purposes of a territory. The invalidity of this provision
of the new act seems clear and indisputable.
Into the wisdom and morality of these taxes it is not
the province of this article to go. Nor yet shall I consider what
bearing any of its arguments may have upon the future of
Hawaii, Guam, or the Philippines. Judge Baldwin has suggested
that the Supreme Court may yet deprive us, or relieve us, of
those islands, by ruling that the Constitution gives to Congress
and the Executive no power to annex, either as States, ter-
ritories, colonies or subject provinces, dominions which are no
part of America."M The establishment of such a principle would
remove one set of questions, and substitute other questions for
solution, as to the legal effect of our de facto occupancy; but
many acts of our officers would be protected by the doctrine
that the courts do not decide purely political questions;" and
Congress could lawfully compensate persons injured by uncon-
stitutional interference in trans-Pacific affairs."
But there is one gross fallacy which should be noticed in
closing this discussion, a fallacy which seems widespread, and
which is applied to Porto Rico and to Oceanica alike. I refer
to the supposition that Congress and the Executive can turn
our Republic into an Imperial "world-power" at their discre-
tion because to conquer or buy the earth and rule it in subjec-
tion, is an attribute of sovereignty, and because we have no
smaller degree of sovereignty than the greatest of European
colonizing nations. It is very true that we have every power of
sovereignty in the highest degree-that we have power to
establish for ourselves the colonial system of Rome or England,
the domestic institutions of Spain or Russia, the religion of
Thibet or Sulu. But we have not necessarily delegated these
powers to our present rulers; and whatever powers we have not
delegated to them, or to the State Governments, we have
reserved for ourselves.
1 2 Harvard Law Review 4o9.
"Jones v. United States, 137 U: S. 212; In re Cooper, 143 U. S. 503.
United States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427, 432-4, 440.
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The Constitution was not made so flexible as to permit of
the exercise by government officials, without a new appeal to
the people, either of powers expressly denied or of powers
neither expressly nor impliedly granted. We, the People, act-
ing in the prescribed form, may tax exports, attaint unpopular
politicians, grant titles of nobility, or establish empires in the
South Seas. I do not understand that our rulers can do any of
these things without consulting us; and if they wish to do them,
they must secure the approval of two-thirds of our representa-
tives in each House of Congress, and then secure the assent of at
least thirty-four States, either by application to their Legisla-
tures or by direct appeal to their voters; for Congress may call
together State Conventions if it pleases. Whenever our rulers
are supported by the American people with sufficient unanim-
ity to justify such very grave as well as novel steps as are now
being taken, it ought to be possible to obtain an amendment to
the Constitution without the slightest delay.
EDWARD B. WHITNEY.
